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Abstract
I revisit the relation between aftermarket power and basic market
competition. I consider an infinite period model with overlapping
consumers: in each period, one consumer is born and joins one of
the existing installed bases, then aftermarket payoffs are received by
sellers and consumers, then finally one consumer dies. I derive the
unique symmetric Markov equilibrium of this game and the resulting
stationary distribution over states (each firm’s installed base). I show
that an increase in aftermarket power increases the extent of increasing
dominance (i.e., a large firm is increasingly more likely to capture
a new consumer than a small firm). This in turn leads to several
implications of aftermarket power. First, the stationary distribution
places greater weight on asymmetric states. Second, social welfare
is greater. Third, under some conditions consumer welfare is also
greater. Fourth, the value of a firm with zero installed base is lower,
and so barriers to entry are higher.
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1 Introduction
Many consumers complain they pay too much for printer toners. But the
same consumers are also happy to purchase printers at fairly low prices. To
some extent, lower printer prices compensate for higher toner prices. Or do
they?
The printer-toner example in one of many instances of industries charac-
terized by a basic market that is complemented by one or several aftermar-
kets. Typically, the basic market corresponds to a durable good, whereas
the aftermarkets correspond to non-durable products or services. Other than
printers, examples include cameras and film, photocopiers and repair service,
videogame consoles and games.1
In these industries, an interesting policy question is how to treat seller
power in the aftermarket. An old argument states that a seller can only
have so much market power, and that an increase in aftermarket power is
compensated by an equal decrease in power in the basic market: the price
of blades may be very high, but razor holders are very cheap. Some authors
argue that the conditions for such an equivalence result are very stringent.
For example, Borenstein, Mackie-Mason and Netz (1995) claim that “eco-
nomic theory does not support the argument that strong primary market
competition will discipline aftermarket behavior, even without market im-
perfections” (p. 459). Other authors, while recognizing the welfare reducing
effects of market power, suggest that these are rather small in magnitude. For
example, Shapiro (1995) concludes that “significant or long-lived consumer
injury based on monopolized aftermarkets is likely to be rare, especially if
equipment markets are competitive” (p. 485).2
In this paper, I revisit the relation between aftermarket power and ba-
sic market competition. The novel element of my analysis is to consider a
dynamic (infinite period) model with increasing returns to scale in the after-
1. A related, but different, setting consists of secondary markets where the initial
product may be resold. See for example Hendel and Lizzeri (1999).
2. Another set of questions relates to the efficiency effects of aftermarket power. For
example, Chen and Ross (1993) argue that a seller may use the aftermarket as a
“metering device to discriminate between high-intensity, high-value users and low-
intensity, low-value users” (p. 139). More recently, Carlton and Waldman (2001)
show that “behaviors that hurt competition in aftermarkets can . . . be efficient
responses to potential inefficiencies that can arise in aftermarkets.” See Chen,
Ross and Stanbury (1998) for a review on the economics and legal literature on
aftermarkets.
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market (which may result from economies of scale, indirect network effects,
or other causes). I assume consumers’ lives overlap with one another. In each
period, one consumer is born and joins one of the existing installed bases;
next, aftermarket payoffs are received by sellers and consumers; and finally,
one consumer dies. I derive the unique symmetric Markov equilibrium of this
game and the resulting stationary distribution over states (which correspond
to each firm’s installed base).
I show that increasing returns in the aftermarket induce increasing dom-
inance in the basic market; that is, under increasing returns a large firm
is more likely to capture a new consumer than a small firm. Moreover, an
increase in aftermarket power increases the extent of increasing dominance.
This in turn has several implications. First, aftermarket power implies a sta-
tionary distribution with greater weight on asymmetric states. Second, social
welfare is greater with aftermarket power (basically because social welfare is
higher at asymmetric states). Third, the value of a small firm (a firm with no
installed base) is lower when there is aftermarket power. Fourth, because the
difference in value between large firms and small firms widens, firms compete
more aggressively to attract new customers when there is market power. And
finally, because of more aggressive price competition, consumer welfare may
actually be greater when there is aftermarket power.
Intuitively, my results are related to two important features of dynamic
price competition. The first one is the efficiency or joint profit effect.3 The
idea is that a large firm has more to lose from decreasing its market share
than a small firm has to gain from increasing its market share. This induces
the large firm to be relatively more aggressive and make the next sale with
greater probability than the small firm: increasing dominance. In my model,
I show that aftermarket power increases the stakes that firms compete for;
and this in turn increases the extent of increasing dominance.
The second feature is what we might call the Bertrand supertrap effect.4
Consider a symmetric bidding game, where the winner receives w and the
loser gets l. Equilibrium bids are given by w− l; it follows that each player’s
equilibrium payoff is given by l: if you win, you get w, but you also have
to pay w − l. In the present context, I show that aftermarket power,
while increasing future profits, makes firms so much more competitive that,
3. See Gilbert and Newbery (1982), Budd, Harris and Vickers (1993), Cabral and
Riordan (1994), Athey and Schmutzler (2000).
4. See Cabral and Riordan (1994), Cabral and Villas-Boas (2005).
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starting from a symmetric state, firms are worse off, whereas consumers are
better off. In other words, in terms of future value a large firm is better off
with aftermarket power, but a small firm is worse off; and the latter is what
matters in terms of present value.
In terms of competition policy, my paper makes two points not previously
considered. First, given a set of firms and product offerings, consumers need
not be harmed by aftermarket power. In fact, to the extent that there are
increasing returns in the aftermarket and the basic market is competitive,
consumers can be strictly better off in the presence of aftermarket power.
Second, increases in aftermarket power have important implications for mar-
ket share dynamics. On average, the basic market will be more concentrated;
and the barriers to entry of new firms increase. Taken together, these two
points suggest that that aftermarket power raises concerns from a consumer
welfare point of view, but not for the reasons typically considered in the
literature.
The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, I introduce my dynamic
model of basic market and aftermarket competition. In Section 3, I consider
the benchmark case of constant returns to scale. I show the one-monopoly-
rent principle results if the discount factor is sufficiently close to 1. and show
that, under constant returns to scale, a two-stage model is a good reduced-
form representation of dynamic competition. In Section 4, I consider the
consider the case of increasing returns to scale in the aftermarket and two
possible aftermarket configurations: perfect competition and monopoly. I
prove that aftermarket power increases the degree of increasing dominance.
Section 5 derives two implications of this result, one regarding long-run mar-
ket shares, one regarding barriers to entry. Section 6 deals with social and
consumer welfare. Finally, Section 7 concludes the paper.
2 Model
Consider an industry with two sellers and an infinite series of overlapping
consumers. In each period, one consumer is born and endowed with prefer-
ences for seller i’s basic product. Sellers simultaneously set prices pi for that
product and the consumer chooses one of the sellers. Next, all consumers,
old and new, purchase a complementary product in the aftermarket. I will
not model in detail the nature of aftermarket competition. Rather, I assume
that firm i receives a profit pii, whereas a consumer attached to firm i earns a
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surplus λi (all consumers value the aftermarket product equally). Finally, at
the end of the period one of the consumers dies, each with equal probability.
Throughout the paper, I assume that, in each period, there are 3 con-
sumers in the aftermarket. This implies that, at the beginning of the period,
there are 2 old consumers. Given symmetry, we have two possibilities: either
both firms have the same installed base (1 consumer each) or one of the firms
has a large installed base (2 consumers) whereas the other firm has a zero
installed base.
I will be looking at Markov equilibria, where the state of the game is given
by the firms’ installed bases. For simplicity, if with some abuse of notation,
I will denote by i the size of firm i’s installed base. At the beginning of each
period, we thus have i+ j = 2.
I next study in greater detail the consumers’ and the firms’ choice prob-
lems.
Consumer choice. A newborn consumer is endowed with valuations ζi
for firm i’s basic product. I assume that ξi ≡ ζi−ζj ∼ U [− 16 2, 16 2]. Consider
a new consumer’s decision. In state i, the indifferent consumer has ξi = xi,
where the latter is given by
xi − pi + ui+1 = −pj + uj+1, (1)
where pi is firm i’s price and ui is the consumer’s aftermarket value function,
that is, the discounted value of payoff streams λi received while the consumer
is alive (thus excluding both ζi and the price paid for the basic product).
This looks very much like a Hotelling consumer decision (with firms located
at − 16 2 and 16 2 and unit transport cost), except for the fact that ui+1 and
uj+1 and endogenous values.
Firm i’s demand is the probability of attracting the new consumer to
its installed base. Since ξi is uniformly distributed in [− 16 2, 16 2], we have
F (ξi) = 16 2+ξi. Therefore, the probability that firm i attracts a new consum-
er to its installed base, qi, is given by
qi = P(ξi > xi) = 1− F (xi) = 1
2
− xi =
=
1
2
−
( (
pi − pj
)
−
(
ui+1 − uj+1
) )
(2)
where the last equality follows from (1). Finally, the consumer value functions
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are given by
ui = λi + δ
j
3
qi ui+1 +
(
j
3
qj−1 +
i− 1
3
qi−1
)
ui +
i− 1
3
qj ui−1
 (3)
i = 1, 2, 3, j = 3−i. In words, a consumer who is attached to an installed base
of size i receives λi in the current period. Beginning next period, four things
may happen: a consumer from installed base i dies and the new consumer
joins installed base j, in which case continuation value is ui−1; a consumer
from installed base j dies and the new consumer joins installed base i, in
which case continuation value is ui+1; and two events where death and birth
take place in the same installed base, in which case continuation payoff is ui.
Firm’s pricing decision. Firm i’s value function is given by
vi = qi
(
pi + pii+1 + δ
j
3
vi+1 + δ
i+ 1
3
vi
)
+
(
1− qi
)(
pii + δ
j + 1
3
vi + δ
i
3
vi−1
)
, (4)
where i = 0, 1, 2 and j = 2 − i. With probability qi, firm i attracts the new
consumer and receives pi. This moves the aftermarket state to i+1, yielding
a period payoff of pii+1; following that, with probability (i+1)/3 firm i loses a
consumer, in which case the state reverts back to i, whereas with probability
j/3 firm j loses a consumer, in which case the state stays at i + 1. With
probability qj, the rival firm makes the current sale. Firm i gets no revenues
in the primary market. In the aftermarket, it gets pii in the current period;
following that, with probability i/3 network i loses a consumer, in which case
the state drops to i − 1, whereas with probability (j + 1)/3 network j loses
a consumer, in which case the state reverts back to i.
Equation (4) leads to the following first-order conditions for firm value
maximization:
qi +
∂ qi
∂ pi
(
pi + pii+1 − pii + δ j3 vi+1 + δ
i+ 1
3
vi − δ j + 13 vi − δ
i
3
vi−1
)
= 0,
or simply
pi = qi −
(
pii+1 − pii
)
− δ
(
j
3
vi+1 +
i− j
3
vi − i
3
vi−1
)
(5)
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Finally, substituting (5) into (4) and simplifying, we get
vi = q
2
i + pii + δ
(
j + 1
3
vi +
i
3
vi−1
)
, (6)
Equilibrium. A Markov Nash equilibrium is a set of prices pi and
demands qi for the basic product (i = 0, 1, 2), as well as a set of consumer
value functions ui (i = 1, 2, 3) and firm value functions vi (i = 0, 1, 2), that
satisfy equations (2) and (5) (quantities and prices, respectively), (3) and (6)
(consumer and firm value functions, respectively).
The endogenous variables p, q, u, v (Roman letters) are parametric on the
(exogenous) values of aftermarket profits and consumer surplus pi, λ (Greek
letters). I will next put a little more structure into these exogenous param-
eters.
Aftermarket conditions. In order to highlight the effects of market
power as a transfer from buyer to seller, I assume that the aftermarket value
created at each state is independent of seller power. Specifically, when one
firm has an installed base of size i and its rival an installed base of size
j = 3 − i, then total aftermarket welfare is given by Vi ≡ pii + pij + i λi +
j λj. My assumption is that, as aftermarket power conditions change, Vi
remains constant. In other words, aftermarket power is simply a transfer
from consumer surplus (λi) to firm profits (pii). There are reasons for total
surplus to be decreasing in market power (the usual Harberger triangle) or
increasing in market power (see, for example, Carlton and Waldman, 2001).
My assumption is intended to focus on the effects of dynamic competition
on consumer and social welfare.
3 Constant returns to scale
In this section, I consider a benchmark case that essentially corresponds to
results previously derived in the literature on aftermarkets. Suppose that
λi = λ
pii = i pi (7)
that is, we have constant returns to scale. My main result in this section is
one of irrelevance, both irrelevance of dynamics and irrelevance (in the limit)
of aftermarket power.
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Proposition 1 Under constant returns to scale, equilibrium prices and de-
mand are equal across states. Consumer welfare is decreasing in the degree
of aftermarket power. In the limit as δ → 1, consumer welfare is invariant
to aftermarket power.
A complete proof of this and the next results may be found in the appendix.
A sketch of the proof is as follows. Suppose firm value is proportional to
installed base (the proof derives this result rather than assume it). Then
the first order condition (5) shows that the second and third terms are inde-
pendent of i: the “prize” from capturing a new consumer, both in terms the
current period profits and in terms of future profits, is the same for small and
large firms. Since consumers do not care about firm size (they always get λ
in the aftermarket), it follows that equilibrium price in the basic market is
independent of firm size.
Given that price in the basic market is independent of firm size, the only
factor of variation in the value function is aftermarket profits. But then, as
the discount factor becomes close to one, exactly the increased discounted
value of aftermarket profits becomes competed away by pricing in the basic
market.
If the discount factor is less than one, not all aftermarket profits are com-
peted away. Consider the limit when the discount factor is equal to zero.
Then firms compete for the additional aftermarket profit of the newborn
consumer but not those obtained from the old consumers. In the words of
Borenstein, Mackie-Mason and Netz (1995), “competition in the new equip-
ment market does not protect existing customers because they have already
purchased the equipment” (p. 461).
To summarize, under constant returns to scale in the aftermarket, if sell-
ers and buyers interact frequently enough in aftermarket, then consumers are
indifferent to the degree of aftermarket power. In the next section, I compare
this benchmark against the case of increasing returns to scale in the after-
market. I show that, first, the dynamics are no longer trivial; and second,
consumer and social welfare vary with aftermarket power in a nontrivial way
(even as the discount factor is close to 1).
4 Increasing dominance
In this and in the following sections, I consider the possibility of increasing
returns to scale in the aftermarket, that is, the possibility that total surplus
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Table 1: Aftermarket conditions: firm profit, pii, and consumer surplus, λi,
as a function of installed base, i, under two possible cases.
pii λi
C: Aftermarket competition 0 ω + i φ
M: Aftermarket monopoly i (ω + i φ) 0
increases more than proportionately with the size of the installed base. There
are several instances when this is a reasonable assumption. For example,
suppose that in each period the seller makes an investment which increases
the value of the aftermarket product or service, and suppose the cost of
such investment is a function of the quality increase but not of the number
of consumers. Then, the greater the number of consumers, the greater the
marginal gain from investment, and the greater the total value generated in
the aftermarket. A second source of increasing returns is network effects. For
example, videogame players get a greater value out of a game to the extent
that they can play it with other players, and so consumer surplus is likely to
be increasing in the size of the installed base.
Regarding aftermarket power, I consider two extreme cases: case C, when
the aftermarket is competitive, and case M , when the aftermarket is mo-
nopolized. Profit and consumer surplus in each case are given in Table 1.
In the competition scenario, seller profits are zero, whereas each consumer
receives a surplus that is proportional to installed base size: i φ. In the
monopoly scenario, a seller with an installed base i earns i φ per consumer,
yielding a total of i2 φ, whereas consumers receive a surplus of zero. Note
that Vi ≡ pii + pij + i λi + j λj is the same in cases C and M .
My main result is that increasing returns lead to increasing dominance, the
property whereby firms with larger installed bases are more likely to attract
new customers. Moreover, aftermarket power increases the degree of increas-
ing dominance. Let qki be the probability that a seller with installed base i
(i = 0, 1, 2) attracts the newborn consumer, assuming aftermarket conditions
k (k = C,M).
Proposition 2 The large seller is more likely to attract a new consumer,
especially if sellers have aftermarket power: 1
2
< qC2 < q
M
2 .
The proof of Proposition 2 is not particularly simple or elegant, but the
result is fairly intuitive. Specifically, the intuition for qk2 >
1
2
is that increasing
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returns in the aftermarket imply an efficiency or joint profit effect.5 The idea
is that firm value is a convex function of installed base size. This implies that
a firm with an installed base of 2 has more to lose from dropping to 1 than a
firm with an installed base of 0 has to gain from reaching 1. As a result, the
large firm prices more aggressively and sells with greater probability. The
intuition for qM2 > q
C
2 is that an increase in aftermarket power increases the
sellers’ stakes in the aftermarket, that is, magnifies the size of the efficiency
effect. This in turn results in a greater gap between the leader’s and the
follower’s probability of attracting the newborn consumer.
5 Market concentration and barriers to entry
In this section, I derive two fairly straightforward implications of Proposition
2, both relating to the basic market: one regarding market concentration and
one regarding barriers to entry.
Let µki be the stationary probability of being in state i (i = 0, 1, 2) given
aftermarket conditions k (k = C,M). Symmetry implies that µ0 = µ2.
Therefore, µk1 provides a sufficient statistic for the degree of basic market
concentration: the greater µk1 is, the longer the system spends at the sym-
metric state, that is, the less concentrated the basic market is.
Proposition 3 Aftermarket power implies basic market concentration: µM1 <
µC1 .
The idea is simple: death rates are independent of aftermarket conditions,
whereas birth rates for the large firm are higher under aftermarket power
(by Proposition 2). Together, these facts imply that the stationary distri-
bution places greater weight on asymmetric states the greater the degree of
aftermarket power.
Is an industry more attractive if sellers have aftermarket power? One
might be tempted to say yes: more rents create a better prospect for an
entrant. However, one must take into account the effect that aftermarket
power has on basic market competition. In fact, for an entrant — that
is, a firm that starts with an installed base of zero — all of the potential
benefits from aftermarket power are competed away, and then some. In the
5. See Gilbert and Newbery (1982), Budd, Harris and Vickers (1993), Cabral and
Riordan (1994), Athey and Schmutzler (2000).
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end, an entrant is strictly worse off when there is aftermarket power. Let vki
be the value of a firm with installed base i given aftermarket conditions k
(k = C,M). We then have the following result:
Proposition 4 The value of a firm with no installed base is lower if sellers
have aftermarket power: vM0 < v
C
0 .
Proposition 4 follows naturally from Proposition 2. Increasing returns in the
aftermarket makes firms more aggressive, especially large firms. This hurts
small firms: while market power increases expected aftermarket profits, this
gain is more than compensated by the loss from the rival’s lower prices in
the basic market.
A potential entrant compares the cost of entry to the expected benefit
upon entry. Since an entrant starts with an installed base of zero, the ex-
pected benefit upon entry is given by vk0 . For this reason, we may say that
aftermarket power increases the size of the barriers to entry in the basic
market.
6 Social welfare and consumer welfare
Increasing returns to scale create a situation of natural monopoly: social
welfare is greater the more concentrated markets shares are. As a result,
market forces that imply greater concentration also increase welfare.
Proposition 5 There exists a φ′ such that, if φ < φ′, then social welfare is
strictly greater if sellers have aftermarket power.
Proposition 3 implies that, under aftermarket power, asymmetric installed
bases are more likely. As mentioned above, this in turn implies greater total
welfare. The proof of Proposition 5 is not as trivial as it might seem because
there is a countervailing effect on social welfare. To the extent that qi is
different from 1
2
, consumer “transportation” costs are greater than the mini-
mum transportation costs. In other words, while the aftermarket component
of social welfare is greater under aftermarket power, the primary market
component is lower. In the proof, I show that the latter effect is dominated
by the former. Specifically, I show that, around φ = 0, both effects are of
second order, but the effect on the aftermarket component of social welfare
is strictly greater.
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Table 2: Approximate values of equilibrium variables when δ = 1 and φ is
small.
Aftermarket conditions
Competition Monopoly
q2
1
2
+ φ 1
2
+ 2φ
p0
1
2
− 3φ 1
2
− 9φ
p1
1
2
− 2φ 1
2
− 10φ
p2
1
2
− φ 1
2
− 11φ∑
λ 6φ 0
Consumer welfare ζ ′ − 1
2
+ 8φ ζ ′ − 1
2
+ 10φ
The inequality in Proposition 5 is strict. This implies that I can perturb
my assumption of constant total aftermarket surplus in each state i. Suppose
that total aftermarket surplus is ² higher in case C than in case M . If I
make ² small enough (a tiny Harberger triangle), then I can find an open
set of parameter values such that (a) in each state, social welfare is lower
when there is aftermarket power; (b) in the steady state, social welfare is
greater when there is aftermarket power. The justification for this apparently
contradictory statement is that aftermarket power, while leading to a tiny
loss in total surplus in each state, leads to a reallocation of steady state
probabilities that places greater weight in states with strictly higher total
surplus (and by more than ²).
I finally turn to one of my main results: the effect of aftermarket power
on consumer welfare. Much of the previous literature on aftermarkets at-
tempted to establish whether the injury to consumers resulting from after-
market power is or is not significant. By contrast, I show that aftermarket
power may actually increase consumer welfare.
Proposition 6 There exists a φ′ such that, if φ < φ′, then consumers are
better off with aftermarket power if and only if δ > δ′ = 43−
√
553
24
≈ .81
The condition that δ > δ′ is not surprising. As shown in Proposition 1,
under constant returns to scale aftermarket power strictly decreases consumer
12
welfare when δ < 1, whereas consumer welfare is invariant to market power
in the limit when δ = 1. Increasing returns to scale “reverses” the effect of
market power (a negative effect) only when δ is sufficiently high (and the
rip-off-old-consumers effect is small).
Table 2 may be useful in understanding the effects of market power on
equilibrium values, in particular the level of consumer welfare. If δ = 1 and
φ = 0, then consumer welfare is the same under aftermarket competition or
monopoly (by Proposition 1). For δ = 1 and small values of φ, I can ap-
proximate the values of the various endogenous variables by linear expansion
around φ = 0.
Fist notice that q2 is greater under aftermarket power. This is consistent
with Proposition 2. The idea is that, under market power, large firms have
more to lose from not attracting a newborn consumer than small firms have
to gain from attracting that same consumer. This leads large firms to price
more aggressively and newborn consumers to choose large firms more likely.
Aftermarket power has two important effects on firm pricing. First, prices
are lower. The idea is that aftermarket power increases the prize from cap-
turing an extra consumer, and basic market prices move accordingly. Second,
whereas under aftermarket competition prices are increasing in the size of the
installed base, under aftermarket monopoly prices are decreasing in the size
of the installed base. The idea is that, under dynamic competition, there are
two forces determining optimal price, which we may refer to sa the harvesting
effect and the investment effect. The idea of the harvesting effect is that, to
the extent a larger firm offers a better product in the eyes of the consumer,
such firm prices higher accordingly. This is the main effect at work when the
aftermarket is competitive. The idea of the investment effect is that, to the
extent the value function is convex, a larger firm has more to gain from at-
tracting the newborn consumer. This effect dominates when the aftermarket
is monopolized.
Finally, we come to consumer welfare. There are two components to take
into account: the aftermarket component and the basic market component.
Under aftermarket competition, consumers expect a positive surplus in the
aftermarket. On average, in the steady state, this is given by 6φ (assuming
for simplicity ω = 0). Under aftermarket monopoly, consumers get zero in
the aftermarket. For small φ, the basic market component is determined by
prices. In fact, as shown in the proof of Proposition 5, the first-order effect on
transportation costs is zero. Under aftermarket competition, average price in
the basic market is given by 1
2
−2φ, whereas under aftermarket monopoly we
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have 1
2
− 10φ. This implies that the gain in basic market consumer welfare
from aftermarket power, 8φ, more than compensates the loss in aftermarket
consumer welfare from aftermarket power, 6φ.
To understand this result, it helps to think of price competition in the
basic market as an auction, the object on the block being the newborn con-
sumer. Suppose both firms have the same installed base. The difference
between winning and losing the auction is the difference between becoming
a large firm and becoming a small firm. Aftermarket power increases the
value of being a large firm; however, as shown in Proposition 4 it decreases
the value of a small firm. The equilibrium value of a symmetric auction is
equal to the value of the loser. So, Proposition 4 implies that the equilib-
rium value decreases with aftermarket power. For a small value of φ, most of
this decrease in firm value corresponds to a transfer to consumers. In fact,
as shown in the proof of Proposition 5, the first-order effect of aftermarket
power on social welfare is zero.
7 Conclusion
Previous economic literature suggests that basic market competition partly
compensates for aftermarket power. Some authors claim that consumers are
considerably worse off when firms have aftermarket power, whereas other
authors suggest consumers are nearly indifferent with respect to aftermarket
conditions. In this paper I argue that, in the presence of increasing returns
to scale in the aftermarket, consumers may actually be better off with a
greater degree of aftermarket power. The idea is that the lure of future
profits that increase more than proportionally with installed base size makes
firms so much more aggressive that lower prices in the basic market more
than compensate for higher prices in the aftermarket.
My analysis also shows that, in the presence of increasing returns to scale
in the aftermarket, the dynamics of market shares in the basic market are
no longer trivial. Large firms tend to attract new consumers with higher
probability than small firms. Moreover, this increasing dominance effect is
stronger the greater then degree of aftermarket power.
Propositions 2 through 6 correspond to strict inequalities. This implies
that the results are not knife-edged: slightly perturbing the model does not
change the sign of the main effects. This is important because, for the sake
of exposition, I made a number of simplifying assumption. In particular,
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I assumed that changes in aftermarket power correspond to pure transfers
from consumers to firms. More generally we would expect aftermarket power
to imply some inefficiencies in the aftermarket (Harberger triangles). To
the extent that demand elasticities are not very great, I would expect these
inefficiencies to be of second order with respect to the gains implied by Propo-
sitions 5 and 6.
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Appendix
Proof of Proposition 1: Since λi = λ, we have ui = u. From (2), this
implies
qi =
1
2
− (pi − pj) (8)
Taking the difference of (5) for i = 2 and i = 0, we have
p2 − p0 = q2 − q0 −
(
pi3 − pi2
)
+
(
pi1 − pi0
)
− δ 2
3
(
v2 + v0 − 2 v1
)
Substituting (8) for qi, (7) for pii, and (6) for vi, and simplifying, we get
p2 − p0 = −2
(
p2 − p0
)
− 4 δ
3− δ
(
p2 − p0
)2
The only solution such that |p2 − p0| < 12 is p2 = p0. It follows that q2 =
q0 =
1
2
. Moreover, by symmetry q1 =
1
2
. Substituting in (5) and simplifying
we get
pi = p =
1
2
− 3
3− 2 δ pi
In each period, three consumers enjoy aftermarket benefits to the tune of λ
each. One of the three consumers pays the basic market price p. It follows
that total consumer surplus per period is given by
3λ− 1
2
+
3
3− 2 δ pi
Since δ ∈ (0, 1), the coefficient on λ is greater than the coefficient on pi.
Therefore, any transfer from λ to pi that keeps λ+pi constant decreases con-
sumer welfare. However, in the limit as δ → 1, the two coefficients become
equal.
Proof of Proposition 2: Define q ≡ q2. This value of q summarizes the
equilibrium, since q0 = 1− q2 = 1− q, and q1 = 12 by symmetry. The proof is
divided into three steps. First I solve for case C (competitive aftermarkets).
Next I solve for case M (monopolized aftermarkets). Finally, I compare the
values of q in each case.
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Case C: λi = i φ, pii = 0. Substituting (3) for ui and simplifying, we
get
u3 − u1 = 12φ
6− (1 + 2 q) δ (9)
Substituting (5) for pi, q for q2, 1 − q for q0, and 0 for pii, and simplifying,
we get
p2 − p0 = 2 q − 1− δ 2
3
(
v2 + v0 − 2 v1
)
Substituting (6) for vi, and simplifying, the above equation implies
p2 − p0 = 2 q − 1− δ
3− δ
(
1− 4 q + 4 q2
)
From (2), we know that
(
p2 − p0
)
−
(
u3 − u1
)
=
1
2
− q (10)
It follows that, by subtracting (9) from (10), we get
1
2
− q = 2 q − 1− δ
3− δ
(
1− 4 q + 4 q2
)
− 12φ
6− (1 + 2 q) δ (11)
Let φC be the (unique) solution of (11) with respect to φ. Computation
establishes that
∂ φC
∂ q
=
(1− δ q) (27− 12 δ q) + δ (3− δ) (1− q) + δ2 q
6 (3− δ) (12)
which, considering that δ ∈ (0, 1) and q ∈ [0, 1], is positive. This implies
that, in the relevant range of values of δ and q, the relation between φ and q
is one-to-one. Hence, uniqueness of φ implies uniqueness of q.
Case M: pii = i
2 φ, λi = 0. In this case, we clearly have u3 − u1 = 0.
(A consumer expects a payoff of λ each period it is still alive, independently
of the size of the installed base.) Substituting (5) for pi, (6) for vi, q for q2,
1− q for q0, i2 φ for pii, and simplifying, we get
p2 − p0 = 2 q − 1− 12φ
3− δ −
δ
3− δ
(
1− 4 q + 4 q2
)
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Substituting (10) for p2 − p0, and noting that u3 − u1 = 0, we get
1
2
− q = 2 q − 1− 12φ
3− δ −
δ
3− δ
(
1− 4 q + 4 q2
)
(13)
Let φM be the (unique) solution of (13) with respect to φ. Computation
establishes that
∂ φM
∂ q
=
1
12
(
9 + δ − 8 δ q
)
(14)
which, considering that δ ∈ (0, 1) and q ∈ [0, 1], is positive. This implies
that, in the relevant range of values of δ and q, the relation between φ and q
is one-to-one. Hence, uniqueness of φ implies uniqueness of q.
Relation between qM and qC. The last step in the proof consists
of comparing the equilibrium values of q in cases M and C, which I denote
by qM and qC , respectively. Both qM and qC are strictly increasing in φ.
Moreover, φ = 1
2
implies that qM = qC = 1
2
(by symmetry). It follows that
qM > qC if and only if Φ ≡ φM − φC > 0. Solving ∂ Φ
∂ δ
= 0 with respect to q
yields roots 16 2 and
45− 6 δ + δ2 ±
√
2025− 1404 δ + 270 δ2 − 12 δ3 + δ4
2 δ (24− 4 δ)
Considering that δ ∈ (0, 1), the latter two roots are greater than one or less
than zero. It follows that, for q ∈ (1
2
, 1), the sign of ∂ Φ
∂ δ
is the same as when
q = 1. Computation establishes that
∂Φ
∂ δ
∣∣∣∣
q=1
= −36− 30 δ + 5 δ
2
12 (3− δ)2
which is negative, given that δ ∈ (0, 1). We conclude that a sufficient condi-
tion for Φ > 0 is that Φ | δ=1 > 0. In fact, computation establishes that
Φ | δ=1 = 1
12
(2 q − 1) (2− q) (3− 2 q)
which is positive for all q ∈
(
1
2
, 1
)
.
Proof of Proposition 3: Let M = mik be the Markov transition matrix
across states i, k = 0, 1, 2. Let [µ0, µ1, µ2] be the stationary distribution over
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states. Define µ = µ1 and q = q2. I next derive µ as a function of q. The
first column of the Markov transition matrix is given by
m00 = q +
1
3
(1− q)
m10 = 16 6
m20 = 0
By definition of stationary state
µ0 =
2∑
k=0
mk0 µk
Symmetry implies that µ0 = µ2 =
1
2
(1 − µ). Substituting in the above
expression, we have
1
2
(1− µ) = 1
2
(1− µ)
(
q +
1
3
(1− q)
)
+
1
6
µ
Solving for µ, we get
µ =
2− 2 q
3− 2 q (15)
Straightforward derivation shows that µ is decreasing in q. The result then
follows from Proposition 2.
Proof of Proposition 4: Solving (6) for i = 0, we get
v0 =
(1− q)2
1− δ
The result then follows from Proposition 2.
Proof of Proposition 5: Social welfare is given by two components: after-
market total surplus and basic market total surplus. In terms of aftermarket
surplus, we have two possibilities. Either we are in more asymmetric split
of installed bases (i = 0, j = 3 or i = 3, j = 0); or we are in a more
symmetric split (i = 1, j = 2 or i = 2, j = 1). In the first case, total sur-
plus is given by 3ω + 0φ + 32 φ = 3ω + 9φ. In the second case, we have
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3ω+1φ+22 φ = 3ω+5φ. So, the greater the asymmetry of installed bases,
the greater social welfare.
The steady state probability of a more asymmetric aftermarket split of
installed bases is given by (1−µ) q. In words, the system must start from an
asymmetric state, which happens with probability 1− µ; and the large firm
must make the sale, which happens with probability q. We conclude that a
sufficient statistic for steady-state social welfare in the aftermraket is
3ω + (1− µ) q 9φ+
(
1− (1− µ) q
)
5φ
The second component of social welfare is total surplus in the basic mar-
ket. A sufficient statistic for this surplus is (negative of) total transportation
costs (or the negative of). Modulo a constant term, this is given by the extra
transportation cost due to firms setting different prices. Specifically, at stage
i = 0 or i = 2 we must take into account consumers with addresses between
0 and q − 1
2
, who now purchase from a firm that’s located farther away. If
pi = pj, these consumers would pay a transportation cost of
1
2
− x, where
x is their address. Now they pay a transportation cost of 1
2
+ x. The total
increase in transportation costs is given by∫ q− 1
2
0
2 x dx =
(
q − 1
2
)2
This cost is incurred with probability 1−µ, which in the steady state is equal
to q
3−2 q .
Pulling the two components together, substituting (15) for µ, and simpli-
fying, we have the following sufficient statistic of social welfare:
S =
15− 6 q
3− 2 q φ+
q
3− 2 q
(
q − 1
2
)2
Taking the total first derivative with respect to φ and recalling that φ = 0
implies q = 1
2
, we obtain
dS
dφ
∣∣∣∣∣
φ=0
= 0
Taking the second total derivative, we get
d2 S
dφ2
∣∣∣∣∣
φ=0
=
 d
d q
(
15− 6 q
3− 2 q
)
− d
2
d q2
(
q
3− 2 q
(
q − 1
2
)2) d q
d φ
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
φ=0
=
5
2
d q
d φ
∣∣∣∣∣
φ=0
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Finally, since d q
M
d φ
> d q
C
dφ
(by Proposition 2) the result follows.
Proof of Proposition 6: Let µi be the probability that, in the steady
state, the system is at i. Let µ1 = µ. By symmetry, µ0 = µ2 = (1 −
µ)/2 and so µ0 + µ2 = 1 − µ. In terms of aftermarket states, we have the
following possibilities: with probability (µ0+µ2) q2, all consumers are in the
same installed base; otherwise, there is a split, with two consumers with one
installed base and one with the other installed base.
In terms of the price paid by the newborn consumer, we have the follow-
ing possibilities: with probability (µ0 + µ2) q2, the consumer pays p2; with
probability (µ0 + µ2) q0, the consumer pays p0; and with probability µ1 the
consumer pays p1. Defining q2 = q, we can compute consumer welfare in the
steady state as follows:
C =
(
(1− µ) q
) (
3λ3
)
+
(
µ+ (1− µ) q
) (
λ1 + 2λ2
)
−
− (1− µ) (1− q) p0 − µ p1 − (1− µ) q p2 (16)
Note that, at φ = 0, pi = q = µ =
1
2
and λi = 0. Moreover, substituting
q = µ = 1
2
in (5) implies
p0 + 2 p1 + p2 = 2− (pi3 + pi2 − pi1 − pi0)− δ 4
3
(v2 − v0)
Using this, I can differentiate (16) to get
dC
dφ
∣∣∣∣∣
φ=0
=
3
4
d
d φ
(
λ1 + 2λ2 + λ3
)
+
1
4
d
d φ
(
pi3 + pi2 − pi1 − pi0
)
+
+
1
3
δ
d
d φ
(
v2 − v0
)
(17)
Consider first case C: λi = i φ, pii = 0. Substituting i φ for λi and
simplifying, we get
3
4
d
d φ
(
λ1 + 2λ2 + λ3
)
= 6
Moreover,
d (v2 − v0)
d φ
∣∣∣∣∣
φ=0
=
∂ (v2 − v0)
∂ q
d q
d φ
∣∣∣∣∣
q= 1
2
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From (6), I determine that
∂ (v2 − v0)
∂ q
∣∣∣∣∣
q= 1
2
=
3 (12− 4 δ)
2 (9− 9 δ + 2 δ2)
Differentiating (12) with respect to q, substituting q = 1
2
, and inverting,
yields
d q
d φ
∣∣∣∣∣
q= 1
2
=
2
3− δ
Substituting all of these expressions in (17), I finally get
dC
dφ
=
2 (27− 25 δ + 6 δ2)
(3− δ) (3− 2 δ) (18)
Consider first case M: pii = i
2 φ, λi = 0. Substituting i
2 φ for pii, we get
1
4
d
d φ
(
pi3 + pi2 − pi1 − pi0
)
= 3
Regarding the second row in (17), I now must consider the fact that vi
depends on pii, and so when computing the derivative with respect to φ, I
must consider both the direct partial and the effect of φ through changes in
q. The two partial derivatives are given by
∂ (v2 − v0)
∂ φ
=
24− 12 δ
2 (9− 9 δ + 2 δ2)
∂ (v2 − v0)
∂ q
=
12− 8 δ q
2 (9− 9 δ + 2 δ2)
Differentiating (14) with respect to q, substituting q = 1
2
, and inverting,
yields
d q
d φ
∣∣∣∣∣
q= 1
2
=
4
3− δ
Substituting all of these expressions in (17), I finally get
dC
dφ
=
27− 7 δ
(3− δ) (3− 2 δ) (19)
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All I need to do now is to compare the values of dC
dφ
given by (18) and
(19). Equating the two values and solving with respect to δ yields a quadratic
equation with roots 43±
√
553
24
. One root, 43+
√
553
24
, is greater than one. Another
root, δ′ = 43−
√
553
24
≈ .81, lies between 0 and 1. Straightforward computation
shows that the right-hand side of (18) is greater than the right-hand side of
(19) when δ = 0. It follows that dC
dφ
is greater under aftermarket monopoly
if and only if δ > δ′.
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